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Abstract
The Worker Food Program (Programa de Alimentação do Trabalhador
- PAT) creates tax incentives for firms to provide more than 20 million
Brazilian workers with in-kind transfers. They are usually distortive com-
pared to cash transfers, but this is not clear when the latter, when paid by
the employer, are subject to payroll taxes like in Brazil. Using propensity
score analysis, we find evidence that the PAT increases poor households’
food consumption between 15.7% and 25.0% compared to cash transfers.
This result, however, may not be improving workers’ nutrition, as sought
by the program.
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Resumo
O Programa de Alimentação do Trabalhador (PAT) cria incentivos fis-
cais para firmas fornecerem transferências em produto para mais de 20
milhões de trabalhadores brasileiros. Essas transferências geralmente são
distorcivas quando comparadas a uma transferência monetária, mas isso
não é tão claro quando esta última é paga pelo empregador, ficando su-
jeita à cobrança de impostos sobre a folha de pagamento. Usando escore
de propensão, encontramos evidências que famílias pobres beneficiadas
pelo PAT consomem de 15,7% a 25,0%mais comida do que se recebessem
transferências monetárias. Entretanto, não há evidências que esse resul-
tado esteja levando o programa a atingir seu objetivo de melhorar o estado
nutricional dos trabalhadores.
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1 Introduction
“In-kind transfers” are give-aways that constrain consumers’ acquisition pos-
sibilities. In poor countries, they are typically food transfers, both of physical
items or through vouchers and coupons. Economic theory shows there are
possible distortions associated with food transfers compared to cash transfers,
such as overfeeding 1.
This work sheds light on a Brazilian food transfer scheme called theWorker
Food Program (Programa de Alimentação do Trabalhador - PAT), which benefits
almost 20 million workers and around 38% of the formal workforce (Mazzon
2016). The federal government grants tax breaks for firms that provide food
benefits to employees. Abatements are usually small, limited to 4% of compa-
nies’ total income tax.
The program was created in 1976 after the Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization (FAO) data showed that many Brazilian workers were living with
minimum acceptable calorie intake (Silva 1998). In this sense, the policy was
designed to improve nutritional intake of workers. Government’s tax break
for 2008 is estimated between US$6.8 (R$16.1) and US$13.6 (R$32.3) million,
but the program was never examined from a theoretical and empirical eco-
nomic perspective using impact evaluation techniques.
Since the PAT is inserted in the labor market context, in-kind transfers are
not taxed. In this case, traditional welfare superiority of cash transfers 2 is no
longer obvious, because they are subject to tax deductions. Considering this
specificity, we test whether the food allowance distorts consumption by com-
paring it with a cash transfer and calculate both effects on households’ welfare.
Although the PAT also allows implementation through self-management and
outsourcing, our analysis is focused on food vouchers and cestas básicas due
to a limitation of our database, which only provides data about these types of
benefits.
We use propensity score analysis to control the selection bias by using the
program’s characteristics as observable variables. The observables that influ-
ence the program’s participation are mainly regional, sectoral and socioeco-
nomic variables. We use data from the last Brazilian Household Budget Sur-
vey (POF 2008-2009)3 . We show that this program only distorts poor house-
holds’ consumption while rich ones are not affected.
We also calculate the deadweight loss (DWL) 4 of the policy to be between
US$2.8 (R$6.5) and US$3.8 (R$8.9) million, which represents 20% to 55% of
government tax breaks. Further estimates show no relation between the in-
creased food consumption and the intake of healthier food. That means the
program may not be fulfilling its objectives of improved nourishment.
We contribute to the literature in many ways. First, we present empiri-
cal evidence showing the sub-optimal result for food vouchers, when com-
pared with cash transfers (after tax deductions). There is no consensus in
the empirical literature about the distortion of in-kind transfers. Hoynes &
Schanzenbach (2009) observed that vouchers lead to a small increase in food
1Hoynes & Schanzenbach (2009) and Ninno & Dorosh (2003).
2Under cash transfers, consumers face a greater set of choices than under in-kind transfers.
3The microdata of the Brazilian Household Budget Survey of 2017-2018 was available in
April 2020, after the submission of this paper.
4Deadweight losses were calculated as the difference in the amount of food consumed by
households receiving cash transfers and in-kind transfers, considering fixed prices.
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consumption for participants of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram (SNAP) in the United States. Likewise, Ninno & Dorosh (2003) reported
an increase in wheat consumption for individuals in Bangladesh provided
with in-kind transfers in comparison with cash transfers. Cunha (2014) and
Skoufias et al. (2008), on the other hand, compared in-kind and cash transfers
to the rural poor in Mexico and concluded there is no differential effect on
consumption.
Second, we present the analysis of the program from an impact evalua-
tion perspective. So far, most program assessment has consisted of analyzing
firms’ specific initiatives in terms of nutritional adequacy 5. Hoffmann & San-
tiago (2017) tried a different approach, using Household Budget Survey data
to run a linear regression model to estimate program correlation with income
and possible effects on workers’ body mass index (BMI). Mazzon (2016) pro-
vided an overview of the PAT along with evaluations using both qualitative
research and a well performed input-output analysis. In this paper we con-
tribute to this literature by evaluating the program impact on consumption
and on welfare to, therefore, present a cost-benefit analysis.
The paper is divided into 6 sections, including this introduction. Section 2
establishes the conceptual basis of in-kind transfer analysis and how it is ap-
plied to the PAT. Section 3 explains the program assignment and identification
strategy used to eliminate bias selection. Section 4 details the dataset and re-
ports relevant descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the estimation results
in terms of food consumption and its composition. Lastly, Section 6 sum-
marizes our findings, proposes policy measures and suggests future research
avenues. There is also an Appendix which makes welfare considerations.
2 In-kind transfers
This section presents the theoretical framework of our work and is divided in
two subsections. The first subsection presents the differences between cash
transfers and in-kind transfers from the consumer point of view. We show
cash transfers are optimal in terms of utility and that in-kind transfers distort
consumer choices. In the second subsection we show how this framework
can be used to analyze the Worker Food Program (PAT) in Brazil and that
cash transfers are not necessarily better than in-kind transfers in this specific
context.
2.1 In-kind versus cash transfers
“In-kind transfer” is a general expression attributed to give-aways that restrict
the group of products that may be acquired by consumers, such as food or non-
food items, through vouchers, coupons or debit cards, among others. Alterna-
tively, cash transfers allow people to buy whatever fits their budget constraint.
Thus, many researchers are interested in comparing their effects, especially on
food consumption. Engel’s law and consumer theory have contributed to this
literature (Gentilini 2007).
Engel’s law asserts that as income rises, the proportion spent on food items
decreases, even if actual expenditure on food increases. In other words, in-
5Burlandy & Anjos (2001), Geraldo et al. (2008), Moura (1986), Savio et al. (2005) and Veloso
& Santana (2002).
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come elasticity of food lies between zero and one, being higher for poorer than
richer households. Thus, cash transfers may be useful to increase low-income
households’ food consumption. One example is Bolsa Família, a Brazilian con-
ditional cash transfer program that impacts approximately 14 million house-
holds or 57 million individuals (Campello & Neri 2013).
Following Cunha (2014), suppose consumers demand food (qf ) and other
goods (or non-food items, qnf ) and they maximize a utility functionU(qf ,qnf )
that is strictly increasing and concave in both arguments. Let pf and pnf be
prices of those goods. The budget constraint is pf qf + pnf qnf ≤ Y , where Y is
income. Line segment AB in Figure 1 represents this restriction.
Figure 1: Impacts of in-kind and cash transfers on consumption
Source: Based on Cunha (2014), own elaboration.
Assume the existence of a cash transfer with value T which shift the bud-




creates a kink 6, depending on food resale price, p̄f :








Y + p̄f q̄f , if qf ≤ q̄f
Y + pf q̄f = Y +T , if qf > q̄f
(1)
When reselling is allowed at market price (p̄f = pf ) then pf qf + pnf qnf ≤
Y + T (restriction CE) which is equivalent to a cash transfer of value T . If
6A kink is created where q = q̄f , which has size AD.
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negotiation occurs at a fraction of full price (p̄f ∈ (0,pf )), then pf qf +pnf qnf ≤
Y + p̄f q̄f (restriction FDE). Finally, if trade is not permitted (p̄f = 0), then the
restriction of interest is ADE 7.
The theoretical framework above can be used to study the Worker Food
Program in Brazil, which provides in-kind transfers in the form of food for
Brazilian workers. The objective of the program is to provide nutritionally
adequate meals to workers in order to improve their productivity.
The PAT rules do not allow beneficiaries to resell benefits and then we
should be facing the case that no benefit is traded (restriction ADE). How-
ever, we are aware that there are illegal traders who charge consumers to ex-
change food vouchers for cash, but the exact proportion of benefits informally
exchanged is unknown 8. This beneficiaries actually face restriction FDE. Be-
low, we show that the food provided by the PAT actually distorts consumer
choices, making them consume more food than they would if they received a
cash transfer of the same value.
Based on Figure 1, cash transfers weakly dominate in-kind transfers since
consumers face a greater set of choices. An Exception occurs when p̄f = pf ,
since consumers face identical budget constraints. Indifference curves I and
II represent two types of agents, whose choices are evaluated in order to assess
possible distortions associated with in-kind transfers.
For consumer II , q̄f is extra-marginal because it provides a greater amount
of food than he would have chosen under a cash transfer. Note that under
cash transfer, consumer II chooses an optimal quantity associated with II ′′′ ,
which is less than q̄f . For consumer I , the in-kind transfer is infra-marginal
since under cash transfer he demands more food (optimal quantity associated
with I ′) compared to q̄f .
That is to say, only extra-marginal transfers distort consumer choices. Indi-
vidual II receives more food than desired (optimal quantities associated with
II ′ or II ′′) when his best interest is achieved at II ′′′ . Consumer I , on the other
hand, is indifferent between the two transfer schemes. The distortion caused
by extra-marginal transfers is measured as:















An in-kind transfer is classified as binding when the consumer demands
more food than was transferred. That is the case of an individual I who
demands the optimal quantity associated with I ′ but only receives q̄f . For
consumer II , the transfer is considered non-binding since demands associated
with II ′′ and II ′′′ are both smaller than q̄f . In this case, only non-binding
transfers distort consumer choices and can be measured by:















Note the main difference between these concepts is the comparison base.
When evaluating an in-kind transfer in terms of extra-marginality, q̄f is com-
7This is the same as giving someone a prepared meal to be immediately consumed.
8For anecdotal evidence of this fact, see Romani (2019).
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pared with consumer choice under cash transfer. However, to define binding
transfers, comparison occurs with choice under in-kind transfer.
Hence, the total distortion associated with an in-kind transfer of size q̄f
can be seen as the amount consumed above the case of a cash transfer. In
terms of the previous definitions:





Intuitively, Df (q̄f ) evaluates food quantities received above the cash trans-
fer optimum (which is bad for the consumer), but discounted fromnon-binding
transfers, which improve his welfare since he receives an extra amount of food.
In other words, extra-marginal transfers move consumers away from optimal-
ity but this effect is partially compensated by a surplus in provision, which
actually improves well-being.
However, it is hard to empirically measureDf (q̄f ) since individuals cannot
be observed under both transfer schemes. According to Cunha (2014), distort-
ing effects of in-kind transfers and their magnitude have fundamental impor-
tance for policymakers. A lack of empirical evidence exists, since counterfac-
tual behavior can never be observed. In our case, propensity score matching
will be used to address the problem of estimating eventual PAT distortions in
terms of food consumption. Further details are provided in Section 3.
From the discussion above, cash transfers weakly dominate in-kind since
there may be a distortion associated with the latter. In the next section we use
this framework to analyze potential distortions associated with, the Worker
Food Program (Programa de Alimentação do Trabalhador - PAT).
2.2 Brazilian program: PAT
The Worker Food Program (PAT) is a voluntary 9 Brazilian food program cre-
ated in 1976 whose objective is to provide nutritionally adequate meals, es-
pecially for low income workers, to increase their productivity. In 2016 the
program reached more than 20 million workers and approximately 38% of
the formal labor force in the country (Mazzon 2016). The federal government
grants tax breaks to firms that provide food benefits to their employees on a
monthly basis. This is beneficial for the government because it grants addi-
tional purchasing power to workers that is not included in the calculation of
social benefits after retirement. For workers and companies, the main advan-
tage of such benefits is that regular payroll and income taxes do not apply.
Benefits may be supplied in two different types: self-management and/or
outsourcing. Self-management applies to firms which provide cooked or non-
cooked meals for their workers. It may involve in natura food supply, sta-
ple food baskets, as well as in-house restaurants. Outsourcing occurs when
companies delegate this task to a specialized firm and/or provide debit cards
(vouchers) or coupons restricted to food purchase, at restaurants or markets.
Companies are free to provide benefits in more than one modality. For exam-
ple, a firm can have an in-house canteen and also provide workers with meal
vouchers.
9Firms choose whether or not to participate.
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In order to maintain eligibility, firms must keep all employees’ situation
strictly inside the law. Any sign of violation of labor rights results in total
removal of the tax benefits.
We now show the superiority of cash transfers are no longer obvious in the
PAT context. In the labor market, any cash transfers are considered salary and
are taxed accordingly, resulting in a discounted transfer T ′ = (1 − τ)T . Dis-
count factors (τ) are payroll taxes applied on labor income in Brazil. For each
additional R$1.00 payment companies spend, on average, another R$1.48 and
workers receiveminus 8.0% to 22.2%, depending on income level. This changes
traditional analysis so that it is not obvious that T ′ is preferable to an equiva-
lent in-kind transfer.
To see this, consider the following consumer preferences represented by
the indifference curves in Figures 2, 3 and 4. AB, CE and ADE represent
same budget restrictions of Figure 1. The only difference among figures is
restriction GH, which represents a monetary transfer T ′ = (1− τ)T < T . Such
transfer may be higher (Figure 3) or lower (Figures 2 and 4) than an in-kind
transfer, depending on individuals’ preferences.
Figure 2: q(Y +T ,p) ∼ q(Y + pf q̄f ,p) ≻ q(Y +T ′ ,p)
In other words, considering firms would not increase their spending when
deciding to provide in-kind transfers or cash transfers 10, it is not trivial to in-
fer whether or not their workers would be better off in terms of consumption.
For simplification purposes, our analysis sticks to the case where benefits
are not traded (ADE restriction). As mentioned in former subsection, the PAT
rules do not allow beneficiaries to resell benefits, but it is known that illegal
traders buy the vouchers at a discount, although there are legal restrictions to
this practice.
We evaluate the potential distortions in food consumption (in terms of
equation (4)) for program beneficiaries. If we conclude that PAT transfers are
not distortional compared to a discounted cash transfer, it means the program
10Or they could shift consumers’ budget constraint back to an equal valued cash transfer.
374 Palialol e Pereda Economia Aplicada, v.25, n.3
Figure 3: q(Y +T ,p) ≻ q(Y +T ′ ,p) ≻ q(Y + pf q̄f ,p)
Figure 4: q(Y +T ,p) ≻ q(Y + pf q̄f ,p) ≻ q(Y +T ′ ,p)
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reaches a first-best situation, equalizing full cash transfers (Figure 2). Now, in
case the program actually distorts food consumption, the scenario presents
two options: (i) cash transfers may be preferable (Figure 3); or (ii) in-kind
transfers may be preferable (Figure 4). These are both second-best situations
where the results ultimately depend on consumer preferences.
The next section discusses the empirical strategy to estimate possible dis-
tortions in Brazilian provision of in-kind transfers for different types of con-
sumers.
3 Empirical Strategy
We cannot observe the difference in food consumption of a unit i when receiv-
ing in-kind transfers from the PAT (Di = 1) or when receiving cash transfer






) to infer causality. In this sense, we propose
estimating a counterfactual for observed units that receive PAT benefits. The
counterfactual would consider the unit that receives additional cash instead
of an in-kind transfer (equation (4)). Once units are balanced, and the selec-
tion of the groups is controlled for, we can compute the average impact of the





0i |Di = 1] = E(q
f
1i |Di = 1)−E(q
f
0i |Di = 1) (5)
Treated units are those households where at least one individual, of age
between 16 and 65 and not working in the public sector, receives food vouch-
ers or cestas básicas 11. Accordingly, non-beneficiaries (the control group) are
formal employees of working age in the private sector who do not receive any
type of food assistance.
Understanding benefit assignment is crucial for eliminating potential bias
selection. First, joining the PAT is voluntary, but there are three main reasons
to participate: (i) tax incentives; (ii) labor union pressure; and (iii) desire to
raise workers’ productivity. Second, benefits can influence choices regarding
job offers, leading those who prefer the food allowance to only accept job of-
fers of companies that participate. Such mechanisms are further discussed in
Section 5.
Therefore, PAT assignment suggests regional, sectoral and socioeconomic
variables are related to participation. Therefore, a vector X of covariates in-
tended to eliminate selection bias should consider such factors. Once X is





0i |Di = 1,X] = E(q
f
1i |Di = 1,X)−E(q
f
0i |Di = 1,X) (6)




0i are correlated with Di , they become





⊥ Di |Xi ,∀i. As shown by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983), X can be merged into
a propensity score, P(X), and equation (6) remains valid with the following
change:
11A cesta básica is a food basket containing staple food items such as rice, beans, milk, flour,
oil, coffee and sugar, among others. Quantities in the basket can vary by company and region
where it is distributed, and items may be substituted with similar ones.





0i |Di = 1,P(X)] = E(q
f
1i |Di = 1,P(X))−E(q
f
0i |Di = 1,P(X)) (7)
Equation (7) is valid under the common support or overlap assumption
(CSA), which states that for each P(X), there may be observations in both the
treatment and control groups.
However, as we mention in the next section, the POF do not provide food
consumption at an individual level, just at household level. So, from this
point on we use households as our unit of analysis. Possible consequences of
using households instead of individuals are further discussed in the text and
two robustness checks are presented to reinforce the validity of our results.
Estimating equation (4) using Propensity Score Matching (PSM), as sug-
gested by Rubin (1974), Rosenbaum&Rubin (1983) andHeckman et al. (1998),
does not require a specific functional form for the food demand equation (see
the Appendix), so it adapts better to possible nonlinearities involved in esti-
mating the benefit and food consumption relation. Moreover, assistance speci-
ficities regarding labor market and its use mostly throughout working hours
demand strong internal validity, which is achieved with PSM in comparison
to other methods. Spatial program concentration and labor union influence,
which mainly act in specific economic sectors, create a unique market con-
figuration where program assignment needs more degrees of freedom to be
modeled. Estimates are considered causal effects of the PAT if X contains all
relevant observables, balanced for treatment and control groups after match-
ing, and when common support holds.
On this topic, Heckman et al. (1998) and Bryson et al. (2002) discussed a
tradeoff when using the propensity score, since more covariates mean higher
chances of violating the common support hypothesis. In other words, includ-
ing independent variables reduces bias but increases estimator variance. Such
tradeoff is illustrated by different types of matching. On the one hand, near-
est neighbor matching matches each beneficiary with the closest (measured by
propensity score) control, and others are discarded. In this case, bias is mini-
mized since each treated unit will be compared with only one control (Dehejia
& Wahba 1999). At the same time, estimator variance increases since param-
eters will be calculated based on a smaller number of combinations (variance
continuously diminishes even if new combinations present low quality, so that
for variance what matters is the quantity, not the quality of matches) (Smith
& Todd 2005). On the other hand, considering kernel based matching, a unit
receives a weight between 0 and 1 if they are similar to treatment, while in
neighbor matching this weight is always 1. The kernel approach increases
number of controls while estimator variance diminishes. However, bias in-
crease since the quality of matching might get worse (Smith & Todd 2005).
Empirically, one must be aware that robustness is important when choosing
covariates. In this sense, our results are robust to other specifications. About
matching algorithms, King & Nielsen (2015) discussed how propensity score
matching can increase imbalance, model dependence and bias, approximat-
ing a completely randomized experiment rather than a fully blocked exper-
iment. They concluded that Mahalanobis Distance Matching (MDM) is less
susceptible to the latter problems. For this reason, ATT was calculated with
MDM in all specifications.
Since propensity score matching simulates an experiment at X (or P(X)),
it therefore allows good estimates of the effects when there is selection on
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observed variables (X). Intuitively, it is possible to find for treated unit, a
similar non treated unit (based on characteristics of X) such that they can be
considered the same before and after treatment, respectively. Therefore, we
attribute differences between the two groups to the treatment effect (Heckman
et al. 1998).
Finally, an underlying hypothesis of this work is that beneficiaries’ addi-
tional food consumption does not influence market prices. Increased spend-
ing on food would shift demand outwards, pressure prices upwards, and thus
reduce demand of non participants, resulting in distortion overestimation.
This is a limitation of this study, since our current database only considers
the demand size. Since many sectors of the food industry are competitive and
there aren’t many entry barriers, we believe that supply also shifts outwards
in the presence of the PAT. Examination of this hypothesis is outside the scope
of this paper and can be tested in future works.
In this sense, according to previous discussion (Section 2.1), possible dis-
tortions associated with in-kind transfers are measured by differences in food
consumption:





In which Df (q̄f ) represents household food consumption when receiving
an in-kind transfer minus demand when under cash transfer. Estimating
Equation (8) involves a counterfactual problem, addressed by propensity score
analysis. Using income for matching is vital due to its relevance in food con-
sumption (Engel’s Law). Those who do not receive any benefits but received
an income increment equal to the benefit value are used to estimate q̂cashf . Es-
timations are performed in two ways:
1. First, we consider equality between income (Y ) for non-treated and income
+ benefit value (T ) for treated workers. This version simulates decisions firms
traditionally face, whether provide $K in cash or an equivalent value in-kind:
YD=0 = YD=1 +T ⇔ T = ∆Y
2. Second, we adapt the setup to the Brazilian labor market reality. Alterna-
tively to $K in cash, beneficiary workers are provided with $K(1−τ%), where
τ% are payroll taxes:
YD=0 = YD=1 +T [1− τ%]⇔ T =
∆Y
[1− τ%]
After assessing how general food consumption of households respond to
in-kind transfers, we propose a further exercise to analyze possible impacts
on their nutritional status. Since the PAT’s objective is to provide nutrition-
ally adequate meals for workers, we separate food consumption into seven
categories: cereals and pasta; fruits and vegetables; sugar and candies; pro-
teins; non-alcoholic beverages; alcoholic beverages; and manufactured foods.
Our goal is to provide insights to understand if consumers qualitatively
change their food consumption when receiving benefits. Still, we are aware
that a complete analysis should consider vitamins, macro and micro nutrients
intakes, by converting final consumption to nutrients or applying a procedure
similar to Pereda & Alves (2012).
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Finally, in the Appendix, we run a welfare analysis based on our results.
It considers a demand system analysis framework to estimate possible distor-
tions related to household choices when receiving benefits from the PAT.
4 Dataset
The Household Budget Survey12 provides income, expenses and sociodemo-
graphic information on more than 57,000 Brazilian households. It is con-
ducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the fed-
eral census bureau. We use the survey conducted in 2008-09. All monetary
values were normalized to January 15th, 2009. The unit of analysis is house-
hold and attention was focused on demographic, consumption and income
information through questionnaires 1, 2 and 3, and 5, respectively. Since the
POF is a sample survey, all results in the paper consider sample weights in the
calculation.
All consumption of food items consumed inside and outside the house
were converted to kilograms by the IBGE. Non-food items were measured by
units but only for the sake of a demand system analysis performed in the
Appendix. Expenses were annualized but are presented monthly when con-
venient and all values are also presented in dollars considering an exchange
rate of R$/US$ 2.38, as of January 15th, 2009.
From the total expanded sample of 57,814,083 households, 7,926,638 (13.7%)
had at least one member receiving food vouchers or cestas básicas, which rep-
resents around 9.9 million workers. Ideally, analysis should have been per-
formed using individuals, but the POF only provide food consumption data
at household level. For 2008, official data from the Ministry of Labor reported
the program had 13.4 million beneficiaries (considering all modalities) and
around 10 million considering only food vouchers and cestas básicas, which
is compatible with our sample. Monthly average net benefit is US$69.60
(R$165.60), and the benefit distribution is positively skewed (Figure 5).
Treated units are those households where at least one individual, of age
between 16 and 65 and not working in the public sector, receives food vouch-
ers or cestas básicas 13. In other words, although the PAT allow implementa-
tion through self-management and outsourcing, our database only allows us
to evaluate the latter, namely vouchers and food baskets. Furthermore, the
majority (∼95%) of the households in our database received only vouchers
as benefits and therefore our conclusions should be interpreted as the results
of households receiving such benefits. Accordingly, non-beneficiaries present
equal characteristics but do not receive benefits.
The characteristics of the head beneficiary of the households are: 70.85%
are male, 54.89% Caucasian, 73.10% married, 48.17% with private health in-
surance and most literate. Compared to eligible households, program house-
holds present 0.06 more members on average, heads are 1.11 years younger,
more educated (2.21 more years of schooling) and have a higher income (an-
nual: US$797.2 and per capita: US$243.5 - Table 1). Except for gender, all
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
12Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares (POF).
13A cesta básica is a food basket containing staple food items such as rice, beans, milk, flour,
oil, coffee and sugar, among others. Quantities in the basket can vary by company and region
where it is distributed, and items may be substituted with similar ones.
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From an economic activity perspective, the professional distribution of
household heads is concentrated in services and industry, which account for
52% of them (Table 2). This evidence, along with income differences among
groups (Figure 6), suggests that socioeconomic and sectoral factors are rele-
vant to explain program assignment. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous
discussion, income is crucial for analysis, and receives special attention in
Section 5, which presents the results.
Figure 5: Household monthly average net benefit (2009 US$)
Table 1: Household heads - differences between beneficiaries (B)
and non-beneficiaries (NB)
Characteristics B mean NBmean Difference
# dwellers 3.46 3.39 0.06***
Man (%) 70.85 70.50 0.35
Caucasian (%) 54.89 46.09 8.80***
Married (%) 73.10 68.74 4.36***
Literate (%) 97.55 88.34 9.21***
Health insurance (%) 48.17 22.99 25.18***
Age (years) 41.98 43.09 -1.11***
Education (years) 9.15 6.94 2.21***
Annual income (US$) 1,775.88 978.66 797.22***
Annual per capita income (US$) 606.84 363.33 243.5***
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Table presents beneficiary (B) and
non-beneficiary (NB) mean samples for selected variables. Traditional mean
difference testing was applied to verify differences among groups. Where (%),
difference is in percentage points. Otherwise, it follows variable measures.
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Table 2: Percentage of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
by economic activity








Table shows percentage of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries by
economic sector. 27% of beneficiaries work in the service sector,
while only 20% of non-beneficiaries participate in this sector.
Other sectors present a similar tendency, showing their importance
in explaining benefit provision.
Figure 6: Annual income distribution of beneficiary and non-
beneficiary households (2009 US$)
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Figure 7: Annual quantity of food in Kg consumed by house-
holds
Notes: figure shows annual household food consumption in Kg. Around 90%
of households consume less than 900 Kg of food but a few consume almost
6,000 Kg, making the distribution positively skewed. Average food
consumption (391 Kg) is highlighted.
Figure 8: Annual quantity of food in Kg consumed by rich and
poor households
Notes: Figure shows annual rich and poor household food consumption in
Kg. Rich households consume 537 Kg of food on average while poor
households consume 232 Kg. Rich households are defined as the top 25% of
per capita income distribution and poor households the bottom 25%.
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5 Results
This results section is divided in two subsections. The first presents our main
results, or the effects of receiving benefits in household’s food consumption.
The second further divides food consumption into seven minor categories and
discusses if there are any changes in composition.
5.1 Main results
In order to eliminate potential bias selection, as discussed in Section 3, we
argue that (i) tax incentives, (ii) labor union pressure, and (iii) desire to raise
labor productivity are relevant when defining the vector X of covariates to
match treatment and control groups.
As for tax incentives, the PAT’s rules establish that participating compa-
nies can deduct up to 4% from income tax. However, eligibility is restricted
to those opting for the lucro real taxation regime, which only applies to firms
whose revenues exceed US$32.8 (R$78.0) million a year. This fact limits eli-
gibility to big companies, mainly usually located in the Southeast and South
regions. That is, spatial location correlates with program assignment.
Regarding labor unions, DIEESE - Departamento Intersindical de Estatísti-
cas e Estudos Socioeconômicos (2013) presents data on 197 collective bargain-
ing agreements for all sectors signed between 2011 and 2012. Around 60%
(120 agreements) contained clauses mentioning food benefits. Union strength
is reflected in Table 2, which shows the services, industry and commerce sec-
tors, known for strong union, concentrate most of PAT beneficiaries, a pattern
not shared by non-beneficiaries. In other words, distribution across sectors
changes for PAT participants.
When it comes to labor productivity, Dasgupta & Ray (1986), Popkin (1978)
and Strauss (1986) provide evidence that nutrition positively affects labor out-
puts, mainly for manual labor. Firms in the industry and construction sectors
are aware of such results, and facilitate employees’ access to adequate nutri-
tion through PAT.
Finally, food assistance may drive decisions towards accepting specific job
offers. Choosing between one or another depends on consumer preferences
(Figures 3 and 4) and selection occurs if those who value food more are able
to choose jobs which provide benefits. Typically, low-income workers tend to
care more about food incentives, so their propensity to accept meal assisted
jobs is higher. However, those employees have less bargaining power when
seeking work, so it is not true they will always face this choice. Consumer
tastes, along with bargaining power, may be translated in terms of socioeco-
nomic variables such as income and education.
Therefore, considering previous discussions we calculated a Mahalanobis
matching using regional, sectoral and socioeconomic covariates. Only formal
workers 14 were used for analysis since formal employment is a requirement
for program eligibility. Table 3 presents results of our preferred specification
using simple regression bias correction, following Abadie & Imbens (2002).
Covariate balance as well as estimates without bias correction (for robust-
ness purposes) were analyzed. Our estimates suggest households receiving
benefits consume 4.1% to 5.7% more food compared to the case they receive
14Workers who payed income tax were considered formal.
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Table 3: Estimated distortion effects of PAT benefits on food consump-
tion (in kilograms) with bias correction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample Poor Rich Full Sample Poor Rich
Benefit 11.23* 30.40** 14.33 14.95** 30.40** 28.34*
(6.74) (14.67) (16.36) (6.72) (13.93) (16.73)
Observations 18,235 3,648 3,625 18,235 3,647 3,625
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Income 1 1 1 2 2 2
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table presents
effects of treatment on food consumption in kilograms. Income 1:
YD=0 = YD=1 +T ⇔ T = ∆Y . Income 2: YD=0 = YD=1 +T [1− τ%]⇔ T =
∆Y
[1−τ%] .
Besides income, other controls are # of household members, education, race,
transportation, services, South and North dummies. Poor and Rich samples represent,
respectively, the bottom and top 20 percent of income distribution.
a comparable amount in cash. This difference is higher for poor households,
which tend to consume between 13.0% to 21.2% more food 15. In this sense,
we can say the PAT leads households to buy more food than they would in
the absence of the program. Benefits would still be distortive even when com-
pared to cash transfers after deducting taxes 16. Richer families, however, did
not present significant differences in terms of food consumption.
The fact that we used households instead of individuals to perform our
estimates could compromise the results since they are not homogeneous in
terms of composition (children, adolescents and adults). To put this concern
to rest we performed two robustness checks. In the first we uses the concept of
"adult-equivalent" to transform residents, making them comparable to a man
aged 18-30 (Rocha 1998). For the second we ran our analysis considering only
the type of household that appearedmost in the sample, which was those with
three members, representing 25% of Brazilian households in 2008-2009. The
first robustness exercise presented similar significance levels and lower mag-
nitudes compared to the main exercise, reinforcing our previous conclusions.
Although the second robustness exercise considered only 25% of the sample,
significance levels of the "Poor" subsample remained practically unchanged
and the magnitudes more than doubled, which is an evidence that receiving
benefits strongly impacts decisions of this contingent of the population.
Since the POF only provides information regarding food vouchers, which
represent about 95% of our sample, and cestas básicas, our results show the
effects of receiving these benefits. 17 Also, our sample is adherent to the PAT’s
official numbers so misclassifications of beneficiaries are unlikely.
The specialized literature highlights that even slight misspecification of
the propensity score model can result in substantial bias of estimated treat-
ment effects (Kang & Schafer 2007, Smith & Todd 2005). Thus, inspired
by Imai & Ratkovic (2014), who focused on propensity score balance when
15Percentages calculated on mean annual consumption of the control group.
16In other words, distortion is not a result of payroll taxes. Even with equally valued cash
transfers, consumers would still buy more food when receiving the in-kind transfer.
17Still, we performed a robustness check removing cestas básicas from the analysis but conclu-
sions remained unchanged.
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defining covariates, we applied an iterative nondiscretionary method to de-
fine which variables should be used for matching.
This strategy consisted of: (i) performing probit regression to exclude vari-
ables which do not statistically change treatment probability; and (ii) itera-
tively eliminating variables whose remaining bias (in %) was the largest be-
tween treated and control groups after matching. Step (ii) was repeated until
no significant remaining bias was found for all covariates.
Income was treated with special care in balancing procedures due to its
importance in determining consumption. It is correlated with other variables
such as region, education, number of household members, sectors and other
demographic variables. The final set of covariates included all of them and
tests showed they were balanced between treatment and control groups.
Still, the results were robust for both bias-corrected and average treatment
on treated estimates. Consumption positively varied from 5.3% to 8.1% in
the full sample and 15.7% to 25.0% for low income households. Again, richer
households did not present evidence of distortion and taxation did not influ-
ence the results.
Another point of attention is that the estimates considered households
from rural areas. Some of them produce their own food, which could dis-
tort the consumption analysis, since IBGE considers non-monetary income
in its calculations. However, they represented only around 10% of the total
sample and the conclusions remain unchanged when they are removed from
estimations.
Many workers in the public sector (called "estatutários") do not contribute
to the ’Guarantee Fund for Time of Service’ (FGTS, a severance indemnity
fund), which is levied on payroll, as mandatory for workers in the private
sector. Some of them are also excluded from the federal government’s pension
program (INSS) levied on payroll. For this reason, we are not able to assure
incentives for employees in the public sector (including government-owned
companies) to take part in the PAT are the same of those in the private sector.
Even though, we performed a robustness analysis including public workers in
the sample and the main results did not change inmagnitude and significance
levels.
The literature on this subject reports evidence both in favor and against
distortions. Hoynes & Schanzenbach (2009) showed food stamp benefits in
the USA provided in voucher form 18 led to a small increase in food consump-
tion. Accordingly, Ninno & Dorosh (2003) reported that in-kind transfers tar-
geted at poor women and children in Bangladesh increased wheat consump-
tion compared to cash transfers. Cunha (2014) and Skoufias et al. (2008), on
the other hand, found no differential effect in consumption when comparing
in-kind and cash transfers in the Programa de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL) 19.
5.2 Food composition analysis
Our results suggest that PAT benefits are distortive in general, but mainly
for poor households. Based on the theoretical framework developed in Sec-
tion 2.1, not all households reached higher indifference curves, so welfare
considerations ultimately depend on their preferences (Figures 3 and 4). Rich
18In the context of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), the former Food
Stamp Program (FSP).
19AMexican government food assistance program to the rural poor.
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people, however, consume food in a first-best situation (Figure 2). Clearly,
they are better off receiving benefits 20, but in terms of food consumption, the
program is innocuous.
Higher food consumption, however, might not imply better nutrition. The
PAT’s objective is to provide nutritionally adequate meals for workers. In
order to assess what such extra consumption means in terms of quality, we
divided food into seven categories: cereals and pasta; fruits and vegetables;
sugar and candies; proteins; non-alcoholic beverages; alcoholic beverages; and
manufactured foods.
As before, the specifications used were favorite specification and iterative
method, both considering a cash transfer with tax incidence and bias correc-
tion through regression. Results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Estimated distortion effects - Quantity (annual kg per
capita) with bias correction for seven food categories







Cereal and pasta -5.09** -4.42*
Fruits and vegetables -3.90** -3.28
Sugar and candies -1.71* -1.63
Meat/Chicken/Fish -1.47 -1.77
Nonalcoholic beverages 2.06 0.78
Alcoholic beverages 1.14 1.56






Cereal and pasta 7.80 12.63**
Fruits and vegetables 1.29 3.90
Sugar and candies -1.16 -0.91
Meat/Chicken/Fish -3.19 -2.29
Nonalcoholic beverages 6.86* 8.01*
Alcoholic beverages 0.15 0.14





Cereal and pasta -9.89** -10.25**
Fruits and vegetables -2.41 -4.90
Sugar and candies -1.11 -1.47
Meat/Chicken/Fish -4.96 -6.95*
Nonalcoholic beverages 9.87 2.21
Alcoholic beverages 4.96* 4.83
Manufactured Foods 4.92 3.49
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The table shows treatment effect on treated (in
kilograms) considering bias correction for seven food categories (T = ∆Y[1−τ%] ).
Favorite specification includes income, # of household members, education, race,
transportation, services, South and North region dummies. Variables of the
iterative method are income, # of household members, industry, construction,
commerce, Northeast and Southeast region dummies.
Considering the full sample, the results show decreasing consumption of
cereals and pasta, mainly in rich households, as well as reduced consump-
tion of fruits and vegetables. Regarding poor households, there is positive
20In-kind transfer releases income to be spent on other goods.
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distortion for non-alcoholic beverages and cereals. Also, although not signif-
icant, manufactured food products and alcoholic beverages presented higher
consumption. The covariates balance and robustness without bias correction
were verified. Besides the highlighted effects, there seems to be no significant
change in consumption patterns, leading to the conclusion of no program in-
fluence on food categories. Perhaps total distortion estimated in Table 3 is
evenly distributed among groups.
This analysis provides initial insights on how consumers change their food
choices due to the program. However, a complete analysis should consider
intakes of vitamins, macro and micronutrients by converting final consump-
tion to nutrients or applying a procedure similar to Pereda & Alves (2012).
Those authors calculated income elasticities for such variables and found 1%
variation for poorer families increased consumption of fat and cholesterol pro-
portionally more, which can be harmful in terms of health. If PAT produces a
similar pattern for its beneficiaries, the authorities should be concerned about
the health impacts.
Additionally, depending on the prices paid for food, consumers’ welfare
may be harmed. The Appendix provides some thoughts on the subject.
6 Policy Implications
The economic literature predicts there are distortion effects associated with
in-kind transfers when compared to cash transfers. The empirical literature
presents evidence both in favor and against this distortion. Hoynes & Schanzen-
bach (2009) and Ninno & Dorosh (2003), respectively for the United States
and Bangladesh, found increased food consumption as a result of in-kind
transfers. Cunha (2014) and Skoufias et al. (2008), on the other hand, did
not find such difference in Mexico. Performing such estimation consists of
comparing a unit both receiving and not receiving benefits, a classic counter-
factual or missing data problem.
The Worker Food Program (PAT) is an important Brazilian public policy
whose objective is to provide nutritionally adequate meals for workers, to im-
prove their productivity. In this paper, we used a propensity score frame-
work to test whether the program presents such distortions. Our results indi-
cate that the program’s transfers are distortive, but only for poor households.
Among them, affirming which household prefers cash or in-kind transfers ul-
timately depends on preferences. Rich families, on the other hand, face a first-
best situation where the program is innocuous in changing food consumption
and, thus, their nutritional intake.
Two policy considerations arise from the evidence. First, PAT participation
should be a choice also for workers, not only firms. This would improve poor
employees’ welfare which depends on preferences under distortion. Those
who reach higher indifference curves under program transfers would partici-
pate (Figure 4), while others (Figure 3) would choose cash instead, maximiz-
ing their welfare.
Poor households that make less than twominimumwages (around R$2,000)
do not pay income tax, only contribute to the INSS and FGTS. This fact in ad-
dition to the incentive showed above would make some of them rationally
opt-out of the program without asking for compensation.
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Second, high-income employees should not be able to receive benefits.
They are unquestionably better off in this situation, but transfers do not con-
tribute to reaching the PAT’s objectives. It is questionable if they need food
assistance in order to improve their productivity in the first place. From the
government point of view, resources could be saved or reallocated to obtain
more efficient results.
Rich individuals would rationally opt-out of the program without asking
for compensation because the benefit represents a very small percentage of
its income. Also, it may represent relevant transaction costs since it may not
be accepted in all establishments and the use of voucher may be negatively
valued by its peers.
Then, it would be necessary to define an income threshold so that only
poor workers would partake. According to PAT’s rules, they are defined as
those who receive less than five times theminimummonthly wage or US$2,195.40
(R$5,225.00). It may be rational to adapt this value depending on the eco-
nomic sector and local/regional differences in food costs. Manual jobs usually
demandmore calorie intake, so laborers should present a higher turning point
and specific research should be conducted in this sense.
The same propensity score analysis was conducted for food subgroups and
no pattern emerged, i.e., there was no significant alteration in terms of con-
sumption quality. Still, no conclusion should be assumed until further analy-
sis in terms of intake of vitamins, macro and micronutrients. As highlighted
in Section 5, nutritional aspects will shed light on the program’s real impacts
on health.
We expect the evidences presented here will allow a discussion regarding
PAT’s design. A program of this magnitude, which reaches more than 20 mil-
lion workers, should be discussed more thoroughly. If, in fact, no nutritional
improvement is reached, the PAT fails in its main objective and needs to be
rethought.
A welfare analysis, conducted in the Appendix, suggests that the program
costs US$2.8-3.8 (R$6.5-8.9) million in deadweight loss or 20-55% of govern-
ment tax breaks per year.
Still, many other aspects need to be taken into consideration when re-
designing the program. For example, it certainly creates spillover effects in
terms of job creations. PAT benefits are widely used, boosting other sectors
such as restaurants and supermarkets or even creating new ones, like compa-
nies that manage food voucher provision. However, it is not clear if the jobs
created, as well as income and taxes generated are enough to offset program
inefficiencies.
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Appendix A Welfare analysis
As previously discussed, evidence suggests that PAT benefits distort food con-
sumption, delivering more food at a fixed price than consumers would buy
under cash transfers. In other words, households are forced to acquire goods
at a higher price than desired, damaging welfare. Figure A.1 depicts this situa-























Equation (A.1) is a lower bound, since the exact DWL area is bounded by
a demand curve, not a straight line. Quantity variation (∆Q) is estimated in
Section 5, so demand price elasticity (ǫP,Q) must be considered 22. A demand
system framework is used for this purpose.
As in Pereda (2008), the evolution of functional forms of the demand equa-
tions was guided to satisfy restrictions derived from rational consumer behav-
ior. The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) proposed by Deaton & Muell-
bauer (1980) is theory consistent as long additivity, homogeneity and symme-
try constraints are valid. The model was improved by Blundell et al. (1993)
and Banks et al. (1997) to account for empirical nonlinearities between ex-
penditure and income. This model is known as the Quadratic Almost Ideal
Demand System (QUAIDS).
Here we use an extended version of QUAIDS which incorporates demo-
graphics using the scaling technique introduced by Ray (1983) (Poi 2012). The
equation is indicated below:
21Note that ∆P = ∆QǫP,Q .
Pm
Qm . P
m and Qm are, respectively, mean prices and quantities.
22Note that deadweight loss is negative because individuals consume larger quantities than
they would at given prices, pcash.
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Figure A.1: Deadweight Loss





























































In the equation, wi = piqi /m is category i ′s expenditure share; αi is a con-
stant; lnpj is log of prices;m is household income; a(p) and b(p) are price func-
tions; and m̄0(z) accounts for household characteristics. Expenditure share
equations and elasticities are obtained using iterated feasible generalized non-
linear least-squares, as described in Poi (2012).
Besides food, nine other categories 23 completed the demand system: beauty
and clothing; cleaning and hygiene; communication and transportation; edu-
cation; equipment and furniture; health; housing and others; leisure; and util-
ities and maintenance. Expenditure and quantities consumed were merged
by household to allow price calculations. When not available 24, prices of the
closest region were used as proxies.
Compensated price elasticities for foodwere calculated between 0.35-0.38 25
in a demand system accounting for regional, sectoral and socioeconomic vari-
ables. Estimates, along with beneficiary households (Section 4), are used to
estimate deadweight loss associated with distortion. Results are presented in
Table A.1.
23Categories were created by aggregating similar products provided by the POF.
24At given prices, households can optimally choose not to consume a good but price in this
case is not observable.
25Estimated price elasticities decrease with income.
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For the market as a whole, deadweight loss lies between US$20.3 (R$48.2)
and US$40.6 (R$96.6) million. Poor households alone account for US$2.8-3.8
(R$6.5-8.9) million, which represents 9.2-13.6% of total distortion value.
Using Mazzon (2016) 26 and PAT number of beneficiaries in 2008, we cal-
culate government total tax breaks between US$6.8 (R$16.1) and US$13.6
(R$32.3) million. That is to say that considering only low-income household,
distortions may represent between 20% and 55% of government’s tax breaks.
























Table A.1: Deadweight loss associated with distortion in food consumption
Sample Full 20% Poor
Model specification Favorite specification Iterative method Favorite specification Iterative method
Quantity (Control) 366.1 365.8 233.3 233.8
Quantity (Treated) 387.0 395.5 282.7 292.3
Price (US$ 2009) 1.70 1.70 1.48 1.47
Comp. price-elasticity 0.385 0.385 0.357 0.357
DWL per household (US$) 2.56 5.12 19.64 26.82
# of households 7,926,638 7,926,638 139,885 139,885
DWL (US$ million 2009) 20.25 40.61 2.75 3.75
The table calculates deadweight associated with distortion in food consumption. For each sample, both favorite and iterative model
specifications are considered. The analysis focuses on two subsamples: full; and 20% bottom of income distribution. Compensated
price-elasticities are calculated for each sample.

